Ukrainian Catholic leaders: Religious practice law needed
Leaders of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church have pushed back on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom's assessment of religious freedom in Ukraine
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom voiced concern in a report last month about a new Ukrainian law designed to regulate religious organizations with ties to foreign powers.
But while critics of the law say it restricts religious liberty, voices within the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church pushed back, saying they’ve monitored the situation carefully and believe the law is needed to combat a dangerous ideology in Ukraine.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed in August 2024 legislation granting the state authority to restrict religious organizations affiliated with foreign entities operating in countries engaged in warfare against Ukraine. The law primarily targets the Russian Orthodox Church — ROC — and its associated Russky mir ideology, which has served as an ideological justification for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022.
The legislation also affects indirectly the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, called the UOC.
The UOC is considered by the ROC’s Moscow Patriarchate to be its self-governing arm in Ukraine. But many of the UOC’s clergy and laity maintain that their Church broke with Moscow in May 2022.
In Ukraine, that leaves the canonical status of the UOC — and the nature of its ongoing relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate — the subject of ambiguity and debate. The Church presents itself as independent, while continuing to face public and state skepticism about its ties to the Moscow Patriarchate.
But questions about the 2024 religious practice law raise broader questions about Christianity in Ukraine.
USCIRF’s annual report, released March 25, expressed concern that the 2024 law might impose “disproportionate restrictions on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief.”
The commission urged the Ukrainian government to ensure adherence to international human rights standards, echoing similar reservations raised in December by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Responding to those concerns, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a clarification in January, explaining that the country’s religious practice law “does not prohibit any of the churches existing in Ukraine.”
The ministry stressed that the law is meant to target organizational subordination, clarifying: “It only prohibits the subordination of religious organizations in Ukraine to leadership centers located in a state that has committed or is committing armed aggression against Ukraine.”
While the distinction has been criticized elsewhere, polling suggests that it holds significance for most Ukrainians.
According to an October 2024 poll conducted by the Razumkov Center, 75 percent of respondents support the legal provision, with only 7 percent opposing it.
Furthermore, 80 percent support banning religious organizations that promote the Russky mir ideology, while just 6 percent disagreed with that stance.
Among many Ukrainian Greek-Catholics, the law is viewed not as a threat to religious freedom, but as a necessary measure to safeguard it from weaponization.
Fr. Roman Fihas, director of the Institute of Ecumenical Studies at the Ukrainian Catholic University, noted to The Pillar that the law was passed in response to the ideological role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in supporting Russia’s aggression.
“The ROC and its Russky mir ideology have served as the core ideological justification for this aggression,” he said. “Banning this ideology is necessary both from the standpoint of national security and the protection of religious freedom.”
Figas acknowledged the potential impact of the law on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, especially given the fact that some UOC clergy, including some members of the Church’s governing synod, collaborated with Russian occupation authorities.
Still, Fihas said he sees the law as an opportunity — an attempt by the state to encourage the UOC to distance itself from the ROC and engage in deeper dialogue with other Orthodox Сhurch in Ukraine.
“Despite its shortcomings, this law represents an attempt by the state to separate the UOC from the ROC and its destructive influence,” Fihas said.
He emphasized that the believers of the UOC remain free to worship, and that no church properties have been confiscated.
“A viable path for the UOC could be a constructive internal transformation through open dialogue with society and other Christian churches, as opposed to the position of isolation that the church has taken,” he added.
Fr. Ihor Shaban, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’s Commission for Interreligious Dialogue and Ecumenical Affairs, also argued that the law should be seen as a protective measure, not a prohibition.
“This is not a ban on the [UOC],” he said, “but rather its protection from the danger of using religion as a weapon, as it has unfortunately become a reality in Russia.”
Shaban pointed out that the ROC has been used by the Kremlin to militarize religious rhetoric and justify violence — a trend Ukrainian lawmakers are trying to prevent from spreading within Ukraine’s borders.
Shaban outlined four key principles that the UGCC believes must guide the implementation of such legislation: partnership between church and state, emphasizing cooperation for the common good; equal treatment of all denominations, ensuring no church is favored by the state; mutual non-interference, a healthy separation of state and church affairs; and recognition that the state has a duty to act in the area of religious security, particularly in protecting its people from the instrumentalization and militarization of church institutions.
“It is important for the world to know that there is no state church in Ukraine,” Shaban said. “Religious life in Ukraine remains free and vibrant ... Cooperation between different denominations — Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants, and even with other religions — is today the number one priority in our interchurch and interreligious communication.”
Another Ukrainian expert argued that the situation in the country might be difficult to understand for people living in Western countries.
Myroslav Marynovych, president of the Institute of Religion and Society at UCU and a former political prisoner of the Soviet Gulag, argued that Western perspectives may be too detached from the realities Ukraine faces, especially concerning the insidious ideology of the Russky mir.
“These are not simply religious ideas, but a profoundly interwoven hybrid religious-political ideology. Central to it is the denial of the Ukrainian people's fundamental right to their own political and cultural identity and independence. Pronouncements from representatives of the Russian Church are not about spiritual unity but are patently political, and this is precisely how they are understood within Ukraine,” Marynovych told The Pillar.
“Consequently, the Ukrainian state possesses both the right and the obligation to safeguard its security from such interference," he added. R
Marynovych emphasized that restrictions on activities can only be applied to specific religious organizations — not the UOC on the whole — and solely through court rulings based on demonstrable evidence of their affiliation with foreign religious organizations prohibited in Ukraine.
Fr. Oleksa Petriv, head of the Department of External Relations of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, told The Pillar that even during the drafting stage of the bill, a meeting took place between the chairman of Ukraine’s parliament and the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.A
All members, including representatives of the UOC, agreed that the state has the right to protect its sovereignty, and internal security, Petriv said, provided the state does so in a legal manner, and with respect for legal equality among all churches, without discrimination or preference for any one in particular.
Petriv, who was close to the drafting of the bill, explained that:
“We closely monitored this to ensure that these fundamental principles were adhered to. This was the position of the entire All-Ukrainian Council of Churches. The adopted law took all these points into account. Therefore, the words from the [USCIRF] report, ‘collective punishment on individual members of religious communities,’ incorrectly interpret the law.”
“Individual persons, representatives of a certain denomination, can be held accountable,” Petriv said. “And indeed, there are even criminal proceedings against representatives of one denomination, but they are considered by the court on a personal basis, as it should be. The law, on the other hand, concerns religious organizations, which falls under the sphere of administrative law, specifically pertaining to legal entities.”
According to Petriv, the provision for punishing a religious organization if it violates the law is not a novelty.
The Ukrainian Law on Religious Organizations and Freedom of Conscience, adopted in 1991, already contains norms and procedures for terminating the registration of religious organizations through the courts if they violate Ukrainian legislation.
“This is a completely legal procedure,” he said. “It has been present in Ukrainian legislation for 34 years. What has changed is that the Russian Church has become a conductor of aggressive warfare against Ukrainian statehood itself, therefore the law establishes that this structure threatens national security. And our legislative body only reacted to what happened – Russia waged war against us, and the Russian Church justifies and defends it.”
UGCC leaders do not believe the law threatens religious freedom, because, according to Petriv, this issue is one of the key aspects in its relations with the state.
“We have been very carefully monitoring this, for at least the last 25 years, since our department has existed.”
“Our Church went through decades of persecution and underground existence, so we are very sensitive to this issue and monitor any changes, and not only us, but also the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, which represents over 90% of all religious communities in Ukraine,” he said.
“We are watchdogs of religious freedom and react immediately when we see problems.”
It's hard to view the Russian Orthodox Church as even a Christian organization, it is the altar-boy (to take Pope Francis's turn of phrase) for Putin's revanchists world view. The tie between the Orthodox World and the State (Caesaropapism) has always been one of the difficulties with it.
The ROC today and the Kremlin truly exemplify what happens to a Christian "church" that unites itself too closely with the state.
It's one thing to have military chaplains, it's another thing to be blessing nuclear missiles and building a cathedral that canonizes the countries military leadership. To say nothing of the more overt celebration of the invasion of Ukraine.
To encourage an intelligent reaction, I would suggest that the phrase that I cite in all caps below should appear in the headline, not three paragraphs down in the article... "religious organizations affiliated with FOREIGN ENTITIES OPERATING IN COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN WARFARE AGAINST UKRAINE".
It's kind of an important point.