--> This does not compute. Maybe I'm simply not understanding it, but how could the court decide that Dusauchoit should have been admitted as a suitable candidate if the court doesn't have jurisdiction to decide?
As I understand it, the court ruled that the Church was wrong to deny Dusauchoit's application on the basis that she was a woman, but it wouldn't rule on the general question of whether a candidate was suitable to be admitted to the course. I don't if that makes sense...
Thanks for trying to re-explain it to me. But, I'm still not getting it. The court doesn't make sense. It's saying that the court cannot rule on the question of suitability for candidacy. When the Church says that women are not suitable candidates because women cannot be ordained, then the court says, No, that's not a sufficient reason for suitability. Ergo, the court is actually ruling about suitability.
I willing to admit that I might be too dense to understand this one, but I don't think there is a way to make it make sense. But, thanks for trying anyway.
Maybe an analogous situation: a US court might say "We can't say 'Harvard must admit John Doe from Poughkeepsie', but we can say 'Harvard isn't allowed to admit or not admit John Doe from Poughkeepsie because of his race'
I understand your analogy. It makes sense. But, that's not how this Belgian situation reads to me. However, I'll just chalk it up to one more of life's mysteries that will be revealed to me at the end of time (the Lord knows there are a lot of them).
Yes, in Belgium, Catholic priests and other recognized religious ministers, including those from Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, and Muslim communities, are paid by the state. This arrangement is part of a broader framework in which the Belgian government provides financial support to recognized religions. This support includes salaries for clergy members and funding for religious activities and buildings. The system is rooted in the Belgian constitution, which ensures freedom of religion and provides for state support of recognized religious groups.
I think you are assuming the program in the United States exactly matches the Belgian program. Though even if that were true, many US programs include the wives of deacon candidates.
If the program receives public support from the State as an educational program, the case doesn't seem too far fetched.
"𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘬𝘦𝘴𝘮𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘥𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘯𝘰 𝘱𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘥𝘦 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘥𝘪𝘢𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘨𝘳𝘢𝘮. '𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘩𝘢𝘴 𝘯𝘰 𝘫𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴,' 𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘪𝘥. '𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘸𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘨𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘧𝘳𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘰𝘮. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩𝘣𝘪𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘱𝘴 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘥𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘮𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘷𝘦𝘴 𝘸𝘩𝘰 𝘪𝘴 𝘢 𝘴𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨.'"
--> This does not compute. Maybe I'm simply not understanding it, but how could the court decide that Dusauchoit should have been admitted as a suitable candidate if the court doesn't have jurisdiction to decide?
As I understand it, the court ruled that the Church was wrong to deny Dusauchoit's application on the basis that she was a woman, but it wouldn't rule on the general question of whether a candidate was suitable to be admitted to the course. I don't if that makes sense...
Thanks for trying to re-explain it to me. But, I'm still not getting it. The court doesn't make sense. It's saying that the court cannot rule on the question of suitability for candidacy. When the Church says that women are not suitable candidates because women cannot be ordained, then the court says, No, that's not a sufficient reason for suitability. Ergo, the court is actually ruling about suitability.
I willing to admit that I might be too dense to understand this one, but I don't think there is a way to make it make sense. But, thanks for trying anyway.
Maybe an analogous situation: a US court might say "We can't say 'Harvard must admit John Doe from Poughkeepsie', but we can say 'Harvard isn't allowed to admit or not admit John Doe from Poughkeepsie because of his race'
I understand your analogy. It makes sense. But, that's not how this Belgian situation reads to me. However, I'll just chalk it up to one more of life's mysteries that will be revealed to me at the end of time (the Lord knows there are a lot of them).
This (from ChatGPT) may help explain things:
Yes, in Belgium, Catholic priests and other recognized religious ministers, including those from Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, and Muslim communities, are paid by the state. This arrangement is part of a broader framework in which the Belgian government provides financial support to recognized religions. This support includes salaries for clergy members and funding for religious activities and buildings. The system is rooted in the Belgian constitution, which ensures freedom of religion and provides for state support of recognized religious groups.
// I don't if that makes sense... //
It must make sense to them. Therefore, since they're law experts certified to decide what their law means, they're right. Logic is easy.
She is not a candidate for ordination, she is a student.
I get that. However, there are no students, in general; the people admitted to the program are admitted because they are candidates for ordination.
So, it starts like this:
1. Is this person a candidate for ordination to the diaconate?
2. If yes, then this person needs to be a student in these formation classes. If no, then this person cannot be a student.
So the whole business of being a student *depends* on being a candidate in the first place. Not the other way around.
I think you are assuming the program in the United States exactly matches the Belgian program. Though even if that were true, many US programs include the wives of deacon candidates.
If the program receives public support from the State as an educational program, the case doesn't seem too far fetched.